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1.

Some Thoughts on
Comanagement
by the Honorable Eric Smith

Introduction

There has been growing interest in the Alaska Native
community in the idea of -comanagement" both as a means
of increasing Native involvement in and control over hunting and fishing by Alaska Natives, and as a vehicle for
improving overall management of fish and wildlife populations. Commonly termed -subsistence in Alaska, the use of
fish and wildlife is a central component of the culture, nutrition and daily life of every Alaska Native tribe. To date, subsistence hunting and fishing has been almost totally controlled by federal and state law and regulations-regulations which impose western concepts of management and
fairness on very different cultural practices. Comanagement
is seen as a way of righting this balance by integrating
Native knowledge, practices, and management systems into
the overall management of fish and wildlife, thereby achieving an enriched and. through vested interest, a better
enforced management system.
There is a wealth of literature on comanagement. largely
discussing either the concept of comanagement or particular
comanagement arrangements I The focus of this article will be
to address some of the key issues involved in the construction
of a comanagement agreement, in the hope of providing concrete guidance to tribes and government officials alike as they
begin to integrate this relatively new management system into
fish and wildlife management, especially in Alaska.
[I. A Brief Overview of Hunting and Fishing Laws In
Alaska
It is difficult to discuss comanagement structures outside
of the particular context in which they anse. The context of
this article is hunting and fishing by Alaska Natives. As such,
before turning to the structural issues which are the focus of
this article, it is important to briefly describe the basic laws
currently governing hunting and fishing by Alaska Natives.
s Superior Court ludge. Palmer. Alaska. Formerly in private practice
(Alaska Native and environmental issues) Anchorage.AK. ID.. 1979. Yale Law
School. BA. 1975. Swarthmore College An earlier version of this artide was
prepared for the Rural Alaska Community Action Program (RurAL CAP) and
appeared in the RurAL CAP pubications -village voices- and
-Comanagement Establishing Principles. Policies and Protocols.- The author
would like to thank RurAL CAP for supporting the research and writing of this
artilde. and the following people for their invaluable review and comments on
previous drafts Mary Kancewick. Carl lack. Carol Torsen. Carl Hild. Caleb
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The most significant such law is Title VIII of the
2
Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act.
Title VIII creates a priority for "subsistence uses" of
fish and wildlife over all other consumptive uses;
subsistence uses may not be restricted in any way
unless and until all other uses are fully curtailed. 3
"Subsistence uses," in turn, are defined as
the customary and traditional uses by rural
Alaska residents of wild, renewable
resources for direct personal or family consumption as food, shelter, fuel, clothing,
tools or transportation; for the making and
selling of handicraft articles out of inedible
byproducts of fish and wildlife resources
taken for personal or family consumption;
for barter or sharing for personal or family
4
consumption; and for customary trade.
While the priority applies to "rural residents" of
Alaska, and not to Alaska Natives per se, the priority
was adopted in substantial part to protect subsistence uses by Alaska Natives,5 and most Alaska
Natives do benefit from it since they live in rural
6
Alaska.
The subsistence priority is implemented
through regulations adopted by the Federal
Subsistence Board (the Board), which is composed
of a Chair-currently an Alaska Native hunter-and
the regional directors of the federal land management agencies in Alaska. 7 The Board, in turn, is
advised by a set of ten regional councils, whose
members are subsistence users living in rural
Alaska.8 The councils make recommendations to
the Board concerning proposed hunting and fishing
regulations-those recommendations are entitled
2. Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act of 1994
(hereinafter ANILCA), 16 U.S.C. § 3111 -26, Pub. L. No. 96-487.
3. ANILCA § 804, 16 U.S.C. § 3114 (1994).
4. ANILCA § 803, 16 U.S.C. § 3113 (1994).

5. See ANILCA § 801(l), (4), 16 U.S.C. § 3111(1), (4) (1994).
See also 126 CONG. REC. 29,278-79 (1980) (Statement of Rep.
Udall); Village of Gambell v. Clark. 746 F.2d 572. 580 (9th Cir.
1984).
6. The priority also applies only on the "public lands,- i.e.,
lands, waters and interests therein title to which is held by the
United States. See 16 U.S.C. § 3102(! ) (1994). Prior to 1990, the laws
of the State of Alaska were deemed to be consistent with Title Vill

and hence, pursuant to section 805 of ANILCA, 16 U.S.C. § 3115
(1994), the priority applied on all lands in Alaska and was administered by the State. However, the Supreme Court of Alaska ruled in
McDowell v. State, 785 P.2d I (Alaska 1985), that the State could not
constitutionally provide a pnority only to rural residents. The State
thereby fell out of compliance with federal law and hence lost management authority over subsistence uses on the public lands. The
State continues to provide a subsistence priority on state and pnvate lands, AuAsKA STAT.
§ 16.05.258, but all Alaskans qualify for the
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to great deference, as they may only be rejected by
the Board under relatively limited circumstances. 9
ANILCA does not apply to marine mammals or
migratory birds.10 Harvest of marine mammals is governed by the Marine Mammal Protection Act.'
Section 101(b) of the MMPA' 2 authorizes Alaska
Natives to take marine mammals for subsistence or
for the making of handicrafts, provided that the take is
done in a non-wasteful manner. Importantly, the federal government may not regulate Native harvest of
marine mammals unless and until it makes a finding
that a particular species or stock is "depleted," at
which time the government may adopt regulations
governing the take of that particular species or stock. 13
As a practical matter, the prohibition on federal
regulation of Native harvest of marine mammals has
meant that Alaska Natives themselves regulate the
take of marine mammals-they are the "managers"
through their own regulations. Alaska Natives have
done so both at the tribal level' 4 and through Native
commissions that are formed around particular
species of marine mammals. One of the most wellknown of these commissions is the Alaska Eskimo
Whaling Commission (AEWC), which has signed a
cooperative agreement with the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) under
which the Inupiat and Yup'ik whaling captains
assume principal responsibility for both regulating
whaling by their people and enforcing the whaling
regulations-NOAA essentially serves in a back-up
role, assuming enforcement responsibility when the
AEWC indicates that it is unable to do so.'5
The harvest of migratory birds-principally
geese and ducks-is an important part of the subsistence way of life for all Alaska Native cultures.
The 1916 Treaty between the United States and
priority. Id.
7. See 50 CFR § 100.10 (1995).
8. See ANILCA § 805(a), 16 U.S.C. § 3115(a) (1994).
9. SeeANILCA § 805(c). 16 U.S.C. § 3115(c) (15,94). The Board
must accept a regional council recommendation unless It "isnot
supported by substantial evidence, violates recognized principles
of fish and wildlife conservation, or would be detrimental to the
satisfaction of subsistence needs." Id.
10. See ANILCA § 805(4), 16 U.S.C. § 3115(4) (1994),
11. See Marine Mammal Protection Act (hereinafter MMPA),
16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1421h (1994).
12. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(b) (1994),

13. See id.
14. For example, several villages have adopted tribal ordinances governing marine mammal hunting.
15. See Milton Freeman, The Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission:
Successful Comanagement under Extreme Conditions, 11 CO-OPEATivE
MANAGEMENT OF LocAL FISHERIES, supra note I.
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Canada banned this harvest during the spring and
6
summer, when most of the birds are in Alaska.'
Alaska Natives nevertheless have continued to take
the birds during these times, because of their nutritional and cultural importance. Recognizing that it
basically was powerless to stop the harvest. 17 the
United States Fish and Wildlife Service (Fy1S) decided to work with Alaska Natives to assure that declining bird species were protected. This led to the
landmark
Yukon-Kuskokwim
Delta
Goose
Management Plan, under which Yup'ik Eskimos in
western Alaska agreed not to harvest certain
species of birds in exchange for a promise by FWS
that it would not bring enforcement action against
persons taking other species of birds.' 8 This again
effectively enabled Alaska Natives to govern their
own harvest of most species of migratory birds.
The United States and Canada recently signed a
Protocol amending the 1916 Treaty to authorize
spring and summer subsistence hunts by Alaska
and Canadian Natives. 19 The Protocol itself and language accompanying the agreement note the
importance of full involvement by Native peoples in
the management of migratory birds. 20 This no doubt
will lead to further and more comprehensive agreements between FWS and Native tribes and tribal
organizations.
The agreements between NOAA and the AEWC,
and between the FWS and the Yup'ik Eskimos, are
often cited as examples of "comanagement. "21 This
article turns now to a brief discussion of the concept of comanagement, and then discusses a variety
of implementation issues.
III. The Concept of Comanagement
A. The Shanng of Responsibility
The term "comanagement" generally refers to
the sharing of responsibility for management func22
tiops by indigenous peoples and the government.
There are many ways to strike the balance of power
and responsibility. Government control over management decisions, with limited input from indigenous peoples, marks one end of the spectrum.
16. 1916 Convention Between the United Kingdom and the

United States of Amenca for the Protection of Migratory Birds in

Canada and the United States.
17. There has been a long history of Native resistance to
efforts by FSvs to enforce the ban on spnng and summer hunting.
The most famous of these was the -Barrow duck-in. when federal agents cited a Native state legislator from Barrow for hunting
ducks out of season. Two days later. 138 other men from Barrow
also shot ducks and showed up with them at the game warden's
office. See OSHERENKO. supra note I. at 47.
18. See id.at 33-40.
19. See Protocol Between the Government of Canada and the
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Indigenous control, with input from the government, marks the other end. Between these two
poles are virtually endless possibilities for shared
decision-making authority.
One commonly accepted model, as adapted for
Alaska by the Native Amencan Fish and Wildlife
Society. identifies eight levels of comanagement.
This model can be quite helpful in evaluating the
desired or appropnate level of Native control in a
particular comanagement agreement.
The shanng of responsibility embodied in the
concept of comanagement can be informal, as when
state troopers decline to cite someone for a violation of a game regulation, thus leaving the matter to
a tribal village council. It can also be formal,
through signing a formal comanagement agreement
with the federal and/or state governments.23 These
formal agreements are sometimes called -comanagement regimes.24
B. Classifying Comanagement Decisions
In deciding on what an "appropnate" system of
comanagement might be, it is helpful first to evaluate the types of "management" functions that are
involved. Basically, these functions fall into four
interrelated categones: research, regulation, allocation, and enforcement. Among other things,
research includes the gathenng of baseline biological data on fish or wildlife populations, as well as
gathering harvest data (numbers, timing, and methods of harvest). Regulation involves any applicable
restrictions on harvest, such as seasons, bag limits,
location, limitations on which fish and wildlife can
be harvested (e.g.. no females), etc. Allocation, in
turn. refers to who is allowed to harvest what fish or
wildlife-for example, the AE.VC allocates a certain
number of whales which may be struck or harvested
to each of the whaling villages in Alaska. 25 Finally,
enforcement involves ensuring that the applicable
regulations are followed.
These different management functions are
interrelated. Research is a key underlying basis for
regulations, since it helps determine such factors as
the number of animals which may be harvested to
Government of the United States of Amenca Amending the 1916
Convention Between the United KAngdom and the United States
of Amenca for the Protection of Migratory Birds in Canada and
the United States. signed December 14, 1995.
20.See id. Protocol interpretation of U.S. Delegation.
21- See. e-g.. Freeman. supra note 15 OsHE; .,o.
supra note 1:
Case. supra note I
22 SeeOsnimE;o. supra note I.at 13,
23 Std
24- Id

25 Se Freeman. supra note 15. at 144-45.
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ensure a healthy population, as well as the extent to
which a regulation may have an unwarranted and
unnecessary impact on hunting customs. In many
cases, allocations are put forth as regulations. And
often enforcement considerations may dictate the
form of the regulations themselves. For example, in
order to ensure that there is not an excessive harvest, western game management relies heavily on
individual bag limits, as these are easy to enforce.2 6
C. Six Key Questions
Deciding whether to include all or some of
these management functions in a comanagement
agreement is lust one of the many decisions that
need to be made in structuring such agreements.
Dalee Sambo Dorough has identified the six key
questions that must be answered in any comanagement agreement:
The questions of who has management
authority, jurisdiction, and enforcement
powers are all necessary to address in a fair,
just and respectful fashion. It is also necessary to identify what species are covered by
the regime and what interests indigenous
peoples and others have in the protection
and management of the species. The period
of time that the regime covers should be
clearly identified: when does it take effect and
how long will it last? A further important
aspect is the mapping of the territory and
boundaries involved, or essentially where the
management regime would be applicable.
Also, the matter of how a co-management
regime would actually work must be
addressed: what mechanisms will be put in
place, what regulations or "pertinent laws"
will be adopted, and who drafts these rules
and regulations? And, ultimately the question of why such a regime is being established must be answered by all parties. This
26. See OSHERENKO, supra note I.at 3-4.
27. Dalee Sambo Dorough. Minimum Standards and
Fundamental Principles for 'Comanagement: Regimes with Alaska
Natives, at 4 (unpublished manuscnpt on file with the author).
28. Section 809 of ANILCA. 16 U.S.C. § 3119. authorizes the
federal government to enter into cooperative agreements with
the State of Alaska, Native corporations, and other appropriate
organizations to carry out the purposes of Title ViII of ANILCA.
The federal government has entered into such agreements with
several Native organizations, primarily to carry out harvest mon-

itoring activities, but also to engage efforts at minimizing conflicts among users of specific game populations. Among the more

successful of the latter agreements is the Oavilnguut Caribou
Herd Management System, a three-part agreement between the

FWS, the Alaska Department of Fish and Game. and eighteen
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intent or goal should be stated at the outset
of the agreement, and be the27guiding principle of the overall agreement.
Before turning to the factors involved in each of
these questions, one last point needs to be made.
Many different types of agreements have been styled
"comanagement" agreements. These include contracts
to gather subsistence use information, 28 agreements
on migratory bird enforcement policy,29 management
of the bowhead whale hunt,30 and various complex
settlements of Native land claims in Canada. 3 The
word "comanagement" has also taken on an important
symbolic meaning, referring to the strongly-held
desire of Native tribes and organizations to exert real
control over research, regulation, allocation and
enforcement.32 "Comanagement" thus has what might
be called atechnical meaning, as when it refers to any
of the different levels of power sharing between Native
groups and a governmental entity, and a normative
meaning, as when it refers to a particular level of community authority that is felt to be the appropriate one,
Inview of the vast range of possible types and levels of
comanagement agreements, and in order to avoid
selecting one particular norm, this article will use
"comanagement" in its technical sense of power sharing between Native Groups and Government.
IV. The Goals of a Comanagement Agreement

A. Choosing Forms of Management and Levels of
Control
Determining the goal of the agreement is the
first decision to be made in formulating a comanagement agreement. As noted above, comanagement implicates two distinct sets of factors: the
level of community authority and the specific form
of management. A Native tribe or organization considering a comanagement agreement will need to
decide on the forms of management in which it
wants to participate and how much control it
Yup'ik Eskimo villages in southwestern Alaska which seeks to

resolve management issues involving the Oavilnguut (or Kilbuck)
caribou herd through consensus by all parties, See Infra text
accompanying note 50; Spaeder. The Oavilnguut (Kilbuck)
Caribou Herd: An Alaskan Example of Cooperative Management
(iune 1995) (unpublished manuscript on file with the author),
29. See supra text accompanying notes 16-20,
30. See supra text accompanying note 15.
31. See, e.g., Berkes. Co-Management and the lames Bay
Agreement, In Co-OPEAnVE MANAGEMENT OF LOCAL FISHERIES, supra
note 1: Nancy C. Doubleday, Co-Management Provisions of the
Inuvaluit Final Agreement, in Co-OPERATIVE MANAGIEMENT OF LOCAL
FISHERIES. supra note 1.
32. See, e.g.. Dorough, supra note 27.
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desires-or, in many cases, what it can obtain given
the constraints of federal law. Depending upon the
type of activity, the tribe or organization may
choose an agreement that incorporates several of
the levels previously discussed.
This can best be illustrated through some
examples. First, suppose that a Native marine mammal commission decides that it is more appropriate
for individual tribes, not the commission itself, to
regulate or allocate Native take, and that the commissions role is most properly one of research and
advocacy. In that case, the comanagement agreement negotiated with a federal agency might need
to address only scientific research protocols,
respective roles for research, and full consultation
on proposed government regulatory and enforcement initiatives. However, the commission may also
decide that it should have principal responsibility
for conducting research and for regulating the conduct of scientists who do research in the communities. In this case, the commission's comanagement
agreement would incorporate several of the eight
levels, notably the higher levels with respect to
research and the lower ones with respect to the federal government's assertion of its authority.
By contrast, a tribe whose members take marine
mammals might decide that it wants to control the
activities of its members largely independent of any
government control. More specifically, the tribe
might conclude that it should have principal responsibility over writing the regulations, allocating the
harvest in the event that an allocation would be
needed, and enforcing the regulations. The comanagement agreement it would negotiate might focus
on these three elements of management, calling for
a high level of community authority.
The AEWC represents yet another example of
how the overall framework issues might be
addressed. The AEWC has taken responsibility for all
four forms of management, conducting its own
research, developing whaling regulations, allocating
the whale quota among the villages, and enforcing
both the quota and the regulations. The research is
conducted both independently and in partnership
with whale biologists from other organizations: regu33. See generally Freeman. supra note 15: Huntington. The Alaska
Eskimo Whaling Commission: Fffective Loal Management of a Subsistence
Resource, InCo-OPEPTVE MANAGEMEN'T
OF LOcAL FIsHEmEs. supra note I
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lation and allocation among the villages is almost
entirely the responsibility of the AEWC and its members, and the AEWC has pnncipal responsibility for
enforcement, with the federal government providing
a backup role. On the other hand, with respect to setting the overall quota, the AEWC merely has an
opportunity to participate in the meetings of the
International Whaling Commission (IWC) as a member of the US. delegation-it has no real authority
over the IWCs deliberations or decisions.33
B.

Political and Legal Constraints
As this last example illustrates, the extent of
community control by a Native tribes or organizations is governed to a large degree by the western
legal and political framework. With respect to
marine mammals. Native tribes and organizations
have a considerable amount of flexibility, since, as
noted above. Native take cannot be regulated or
allocated by the federal government unless a
species is found to be depleted. By contrast, spnng
and summer hunting of migratory birds currently is
flatly prohibited by the treaty with Canada-at least
until the Senate ratifies the new Protocol
Amendment to that treaty. Native groups wishing to
pursue comanagement agreements on migratory
birds therefore have had to focus on enforcement,
as has been done quite successfully with the YukonKuskokwim Delta Goose Management Plan. That
agreement essentially represents a shanng of
authority over enforcement of migratory bird hunting. under which the federal government enforces a
set of agreed upon bans of hunting and/or egging of
four species of birds while Native groups regulate
hunting of all other species . 4
The western legal and political framework is
particularly important to consider in the context of
tribal control over fishing and hunting of territorial
mammals. Some Alaska Native activists believe that
comanagement can only be properly implemented
in this context if full authority and lunsdiction are
vested in the tribes. 35 At present, however, the federal and state governments have claimed virtually
complete lunsdictlon over tribal hunting and fishing. leaving little room for tribal control.36 This sugVenette Reserve are Indian country The language of the court's
opinion suggests that other lands owned by Alaska Native village

34. See supra text accompanying note 18.

corporations organized pursuant to the Alaska Native Cla-irSettlement Act also may be Indian country. Whether such recog-

35. See. e.g.. Dorough. supra note 27.

nition of Indian country will mean tribal iunsidiction over fish and

36. Tribes generally can have iunsdiction over fish and

the Ventte decision to the U-S. Supreme Court--the State has con-

wildlife only to the extent that that junsdiction is preserved by a

federal statute or treaty or is exercised within 'Indian country.- See
generally, FEux S. COHEN. HAND1OOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 441-70
(1982). The U.S. Court of Appeals recently ruled in State of Alaska

ex rel. Yukon Flats Sch. Dist. v.Native Village of Venetie Tnbal Govt.
101 F.3d 1286 (9th Cir. 1996). that the lands compnsing the former

wildlife is not dear at this point. The State of Alaska has appealed

sistently strongly advocated against the existence of Indian coun-

try. and hence against tnbal junsdiction over fish and wildlife In
lune 1997. the US Supreme court granted certioran See Alaska"

Native Village of Venetie Tribal Govt. 117 S. Ct. 2478 (1997) The
case is scheduled to be argued in December. 1997
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gests that achieving full authority for the tribes will
require a substantial change in federal policy, and

perhaps in federal law. Tribes and Native organiza-

tions will need to address whether they can or will
accept a comanagement agreement that embodies
anything less than full tribal control. in answering
this question, tribes and Native organizations might
want to consider the following:

I. Whether full tribal control is necessary
to meet their needs in a particular coman-

agement agreement.
2. Whether full tribal control must be an
immediate objective that must be attained
before beginning the process of negotiating comanagement agreements, or
whether this is a long-term goal to be
attained in part through negotiating
comanagement agreements embodying
ever-increasing amounts of community
authority.
In summary, in deciding on the goal of a
comanagement agreement, it is important to determine the type or types of management that will be
covered and the level of community control that is
desired. In making this decision, the legal and political context will govern, to some extent, what is possible-but the negotiations themselves may well
push the government authorities into agreeing to
something they initially thought was not possible.
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edly, considerable interest among tribes in developing comanagement agreements with the government on regulation of hunting and fishing by their
members.
Obviously, there is some potential for overlap
in these agreements. For example, a marine mammal commission might be interested in signing a
comanagement agreement that gives it considerable authority to regulate hunting, at the same time
that individual tribes are approaching the government for the same purpose. Accordingly, there is a
need for careful coordination and communication
among the various interested parties, so that the
appropriate entities assume proper roles. In particular, there may well need to be some agreement or
framework established to set out a process for
determining which entity should take on which
management tasks with respect to a particular area
or a particular species, be it a tribe, a Native nonprofit or other regional group, or a Native commission. 38 This will be particularly important with
respect to comanagement agreements entered into
under section 119 of the MMPA,3 9 which may be a
source of funding for implementing comanagement
agreements 40-since the funding will be limited,
careful coordination will be needed to avoid competition and duplicative efforts.
VI. The Species Covered by a Comanagement
Agreement

(WCC) is the principal Native signatory to the
Goose Management Plan, and several Native nonprofit organizations have signed agreements with
the Fish and Wildlife Service pursuant to section
809 of ANILCA. Other Native organizations are also
looking into comanagement, and there is undoubt-

To date, most comanagement agreements
between Native groups and the federal government
have concerned either a particular species, such as
walrus, bowhead whales, and sea otters, or a particular issue, such as migratory bird hunting or
subsistence uses on federal lands. This trend is
likely to continue with respect to marine mammal
commissions, the WCC, and the section 809 agreements. But again, there is a strong potential for
overlap among the different possible comanagement agreements.
For example, a tribe might want to enter into a
comanagement agreement covering hunting of all
species used by its members, including marine
mammals, birds, and terrestrial mammals, This
obviously creates the possibility of overlap and

37. These include the AEWC, the Eskimo Walrus
Commission, and the Alaska Sea Otter Commission.
38. As relevant to this article, there are three general types
of Native organizations in Alaska. The first is the federally recognized tribes. A second type consists of what are generally termed
the "non-profits-these are tribal organizations, organized on a
regional level, which are empowered by their member tribes to
deliver services (such as health, realty, and advocacy) to the
member tribes and tribal members. Finally, Native commissions

have been created to advocate on behalf of the users of particular species of animals, mostly marine mammals-the Alaska
Eskimo Whaling Commission is among the more well known of
these organizations.
39. See 16 U.S.C. § 1388 (1994).
40. Section 119 of the MMPA authorizes up to $2.5 million
to be appropriated by Congress to develop comaragement agreements with Native organizations. See id.

V. Who Has Comanagement Authority
Who are the appropriate Native parties to be
entering into comanagement agreements with the
federal and/or state governments? Several Alaska
Native marine mammal commissions have signed
memoranda of agreement with the federal government;37 the Waterfowl Conservation Commission
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perhaps even inconsistency with agreements
signed by other entities, such as an agreement
concerning walrus and the Goose Management
Plan. In addition, the species used by the tribe's
members often may be used by members of other
tribes, which will require coordination with the
other tribes to ensure that there are no conflicts or
inconsistencies.
As these considerations indicate, any framework for comanagement agreements also will
need to cover a process for communication and
coordination as to the species covered by a particular agreement. This, again, will be particularly
important in the section 119 process, since both
tribes and commissions may be interested in
developing comanagement agreements for the
same species.
VII. The Time Period of an Agreement
In general, most comanagement agreements
either contain a specific expiration date, with an
opportunity for renewal, or are designed to last
unless and until one of the parties formally notifies
the others that it wishes to terminate the agreement. The advantage of a specific term for the
agreement is that it forces the parties to revisit the
agreement periodically, so that they can change it
to accommodate altered or different circumstances.
This has been of great benefit in the Goose
Management Plan, since conditions have changed
4
since the first Plan was adopted. i
On the other hand, being forced to renegotiate
can impose burdens and expense on the parties
which can be needless if there is no reason to
change the agreement on a regular basis. Avoiding
this cost is probably the principal advantage to
making the agreement remain in effect unless and
until it is terminated. Of course, if the latter type of
agreement cannot be amended, then it can lack the
necessary flexibility to adapt if circumstances do
change. This can easily be avoided, however, by
including a provision in the agreement that it can
be modified by the parties if necessary.
It probably is easiest not to include a specific
term in a comanagement agreement, but to provide
that the agreement can be modified by mutual consent of the parties. Where circumstances-such as
levels of funding or populations of particular
species--do change on a yearly basis, it may make
sense either to include a specific term or to make
specific parts of the agreement sublect to renegotiation each year.
41. Interview with Calvin Simeon. Natural Resources
Director. Association of Village Council Presidents. in Bethel.
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VIll.Vhere a Comanagement Agreement Could Apply
In most cases, the geographic area covered by a
comanagement agreement will be quite important.
This is clearest with respect to comanagement
agreements with tribes, since they can only exert
authority within their territonal lunsdiction. This, of
course, will require the federal government to recognize tribal lunsdiction if tribes are fully to manage hunting and fishing in a manner consistent with
the tribe's inherent authorities.
Other comanagement agreements which would
need to define the relevant geographic territory
include agreements on research and on collecting
subsistence use data in particular areas, agreements
on enforcement of migratory bird hunting, and any
regional management plans for manne mammals. On
the other hand, some agreements may not need a territonal component. One example would be a manne
mammal agreement pertaining to research and communication with respect to a particular species, since
the agreement would pertain to any and all activities
regarding the species, regardless of where they occur.
There may, again, be a possibility for overlap in
comanagement territones. For example, a tribe and
a regional organization might seek a comanagement agreement on how research may be conducted in the tribe's area. As a general matter, however,
this territorial issue should ordinarily coincide with
the issue of who should enter into the agreement,
and so can be resolved at the same time.
IX. The Content of a Comanagement Agreement
As discussed above, existing comanagement
agreements address a vanety of topics with varying
levels of Native control over decision-making.
Underlying the choices that have been made in each
agreement are decisions as to each of the five
issues addressed above. Needless to say, these
decisions only set the framework for what the agreement actually will achieve. There are, in turn, at
least three sets of considerations involved in
addressing this issue; the management functions of
research, regulation, allocation, and enforcement; a
dispute resolution mechanism: and funding.
A. Management Functions
The relevant factors involved in designing a
comanagement agreement can be evaluated in part
by reference to each of the four functions implicit in
management of fish and wildlife resources:
research, regulation, allocation, and enforcement.
Alaska
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I. Research
The Native community is in the process of
developing research protocols to guide western scientists in their work in Native villages. 42 Of equal
importance are efforts presently underway to develop systems for integrating the traditional knowledge of Native peoples into western scientific
research and into the decision-making process.43 A
third key factor involves how federal and state agencies use the information they are provided, be it
through western science or by individual Natives
and Native tribes and organizations. This is especially true with respect to subsistence uses of fish
and wildlife-all too often, Natives have found that
44
the information they provide is used against them.
Once the basic decisions are made as to how to
approach each of these factors, they can be worked
into a framework that all future comanagement
agreements focusing on research can use.
2. Regulation
Regulation often proves to be among the most
intractable issues, since both the state and federal
governments are particularly jealous of their
authority to regulate uses of fish and wildlife for
conservation purposes. They also tend to bring a
bias against forms of management that differ from
what they are taught in fisheries and wildlife management courses, which generally are based on a
sport or commercial use framework. 45 In the United
States, this has generally translated to a "we manage and you cooperate" sort of arrangement, with
relatively little power granted to Native tribes or
organizations. 46 The Canadians have (at least in theory) been more open to fuller indigenous participation, structuring most of their land claims to
include management boards composed of equal
numbers of Natives and government officials. These
boards operate by consensus, but their decisions
are subject to review, modification, and even reversal by the appropriate Canadian minister.
Apparently, the minister rarely changes or relects
what a board recommends, precisely because they
are conducted by consensus.

47

In view of these constraints, Native tribes and
organizations will likely be faced with making the
42. For example, the Alaska Federation of Natives developed a set of protocols to guide research in any Native community, under which researchers are asked to communicate with the
community before conducting their research, to make it clear iust
what the object of the research is, to work with the community to
avoid any unintended violations of local cultural rules, and to
inform the community of the results of the research.
43. Alaska Natives have created an Alaska Native Science
Commission, which has as a primary goal the collection and inte-

hard decision as to how much regulatory authority
to press for in comanagement negotiations. While
this decision will no doubt need to be made for
any of the management functions, it is particularly
important in the context of regulation, since this is
where the constraints and the disputes can be the
strongest. There are a variety of possibilities in
this respect. The Native community could, as a
whole, arrive at a level of community authority that
it feels is necessary in order to sign any comanagement agreement, or it could leave the decision
as to the appropriate level of involvement to each
individual negotiation. The Native community
could also identify particular standards as goals,
rather than minimum guarantees, that must
underlie any agreement.
3. Allocation
Allocation issues arise in two contexts: allocation within the Native community, and allocation
between Native and non-Native users. Allocation
between Native and non-Native users raises the
same sets of concerns as regulation of fishing and
hunting. There obviously are strong interests
involved here, most notably sport hunters, sport
fishermen, and commercial fishermen, but also
"nonconsumptive users" who value looking at
wildlife or just appreciate knowing the wildlife is
there. Representatives of these groups may want
some role in deciding allocations. The role of other
users will have to be factored into both a comanagement agreement and any framework on comanagement that the Native community devises.
There seems to be no reason that government
agencies outside of the tribe should get involved in
the internal issue of how to allocate fish and wildlife
within a Native community or among different
Native communities. The key question for outside
managers is the total overall Native harvest, not
who takes the animal. This type of allocation is best
left to the Native entity or entities.
4. Enforcement
Federal and state agencies also tend to be
quite intent on preserving their overall authority to
enforce federal and state law. On the other hand,
gration of Native knowledge into the decision maklng process,
44. KOTZEBUE FISH AND G-me ADvisoRY COMMn"EE, REGULATION
REVIEW:A REvIEw OF THE GAME REGULATIONSAFFECTING NoEHWvEsT

ALASKA (Oct. 1986).

45. See USHER, supra note I, at 2-3.
46. See KOTZEBUE FISH AND GAMIE ADVISORY COMMII"EE, supra
note 44.

47. See Berkes, supra note 31.
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they have been willing essentially to delegate that
authority in limited contexts, most importantly to
the Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission with
respect to whaling, and, to a lesser extent, to tribes
in the Yukon-Kuskokwim Delta with regard to migratory birds. 48 The approach used in these contexts.
whereby the Native entity takes on initial and principal enforcement authority, with the government
serving a backup role in the event that Native
enforcement is not successful, would seem to be
one that should work in most areas, and so perhaps
could be an element of the framework on comanagement developed by the Native community.
B. Dispute Resolution
The very concept of comanagement revolves
centrally around the notion that responsibility over
management must be shared in some fashion
between indigenous people and the federal and/or
state governments. The manner in which that
responsibility is shared should, for the most part,
itself provide the principal mechanism by which disputes between Native users and government managers are resolved. For example, the Goose
Management Plan effectively resolved a dispute
over enforcement of the Migratory Bird Treaty by
identifying the species that Natives would hunt
without federal interference and those that Natives
agreed not to hunt.
On the other hand, there may well be many
occasions where disputes will arise in implementing a comanagement agreement. For example.
Native users may have different ideas regarding the
health of a wildlife population from the federal biologists, and so would push for different allowable
levels of harvest. To the extent that a comanagement agreement does not place sole authority over
these decisions with either Native users or the government, there will need to be some mechanism
that resolves such disputes. In Canada, for example.
the management boards discuss these issues and
attempt to arrive at a consensus. 49 This is also the
case with respect to the Kilbuck Caribou herd on the
Yukon-Kuskokwim Delta. where caribou hunters
and the government arrive at a consensus position
each year on how many caribou may be harvested.
and present that position to the relevant state and
federal agencies for approval.' 0
In both of these cases, the consensus position
is sublect to final review and approval by the gov48. See supra text accompanying notes 15-20
49. See Berkes. supra note 31
50. See Spaeder. supra note 28
5 1. See Case. supra note I
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ernment. Alaska Natives may want to consider
whether this is an appropriate approach for all
comanagement agreements, whether they want to
push for a stronger role in this respect, or whether
they want to leave the matter for negotiation in
each comanagement agreement. It seems clear, in
any event, that any dispute resolution mechanism
will require two elements: a process of meetings
between the vanous sides in order to attempt to
resolve the matter, and some agreed-upon entity
with final decision making authority.
C. Funding
It is obvious that there can be no effective
comanagement if Native tribes or organizations lack
the funding and/or trained personnel to implement
a comanagement agreement, Adequate funding has
been a key reason behind the effectiveness of the
Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission.5i and it has
enabled several Native non-profits to engage in
their own research and data collection on Native
subsistence uses in their area.' 2 Thus, a central element of any comanagement negotiation will involve
how the Native tribe or organization will be able to
pay for its work.
Funding mechanisms can be built directly into
the comanagement agreement, as is contemplated
by section 119 of the MMPA: they can be guaranteed
through a contract with a federal agency: or they can
be provided independently, as is the case with the
Whaling Commission. The Native community may
wish to address whether to insist, in a comanagement framework, that funding be part of any agreement. or whether to leave this to the individual
negotiations.
One issue that a framework usually must
address is resolving competition for limited fundIng This is likely to arise in the implemention of
section 119 of the MMPA. Funding under this section is key to ensuring the success of any comanagement agreements signed pursuant to this section. yet only a limited amount of money is likely to
be available. This means that many Native tribes
and organizations may be competing for the same
funds In order to avoid disputes, and more importantly, to avoid federal government pnorities rather
than the Native community's priorities controlling
the funding decisions, it is important that the
Native community arrive at its own framework for
deciding how to allocate these limited funds.
52 Interview with Calvin Simeon. supra note 41; interview
with George Yaska. Wildlife and Parks Director. Tanana Chiefs
Conference. in Fairbanks. Alaska.
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Summary and Conclusion

The factors discussed in this paper apply to any
comanagement agreements, that are signed with
federal and/or state agencies and to any overall
framework designed by the Native community to
guide Native tribes and organizations in their negotiations. In many cases, such as deciding which
types of management functions to include in the
agreement and which entity is the most appropriate
one to participate, the decision probably will have
to be made on a case-by-case basis respecting a
particular comanagement agreement, through discussions among the different Native entities
involved. In other cases, an overall framework can
serve as an effective way to protect the Native community's interests as the comanagement process
moves forward.
The following issues appear to be the most likely candidates for inclusion or discussion in an overall comanagement framework:
1. Research protocols.
2. Mechanisms for inclusion of traditional
Native knowledge in decision-making.
3. Mechanisms for assisting Native organizations in discussing allocation of overlapping authority over a particular species or
topic (e.g., tribal versus regional authority
over hunting marine mammals).
4. The extent to which principal authority
for comanagement should be vested in
tribes.
5 Standards for deciding the minimum levels of community authority acceptable to
the Native community in different contexts.
6. The manner in which enforcement
authority should be shared, e.g., an insistence on the Whaling Commission model.
7 Standards for dispute resolution mechanisms.
8. Assurances of adequate funding for
comanagement activities on an ongoing
basis, and mechanisms for preventing
competition for limited funds.
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Comanagement is potentially a very powerful
tool for managing fish and wildlife in Alaska in a
manner that both conserves the species and meets
the needs of the Native community. While they are
becoming more receptive to the idea, federal and
state agencies remain suspicious of the concept
and jealous of their authority and funding, This gap
can be bridged, and comanagement can be
advanced, through the development of a framework
for comanagement agreements, for this will assist
Native tribes and organizations in formulating what
they believe to be an acceptable comanagement
regime, as well as federal and state agencies in
understanding the real value of these regimes.

